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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast highlights the core principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and stopping hostilities—though how this squares with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This pivot is major, but experts caution it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Tensions

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Conditional Action

A similar confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the harsh rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.